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Never let me clone? 
Countering an ethical argument against the reproductive cloning of humans
Yvette Pearson
In the March 2006 issue of EMBO reports,Christof Tannert, a bioethicist at the MaxDelbrück Research Centre in Berlin,
Germany, presented a moral argument
against human reproductive cloning on the
basis of Immanuel Kant’s categorical imper-
ative (Tannert, 2006). In this article, I
address some problems with Tannert’s views
and show that our concerns about this
prospective procedure should prompt us to
scrutinize carefully the conventional pro-
creative practices and attitudes. Indeed, if
we set aside objections that are grounded in
genetic determinism, many of the offensive
features of human cloning are identical to
problems with procreation by more conven-
tional means, including both old-fashioned
procreation and assisted reproductive tech-
nologies (ARTs). Oddly enough, many see
only cloning as problematic, whereas iden-
tical problems with everyday procreation
continue to go unnoticed.
In his article, Tannert endeavours to pro-
vide us with a sound argument that human
reproductive cloning “violates our basic
moral principles”. He grounds his argument
in Immanuel Kant’s central moral principle
of respect for all humanity, which the great
philosopher formulated as: “Act so that you
treat humanity, whether in your own person
or in the person of any other, always at the
same time as an end, never as a means
only” (Kant, 1785). In essence, Kant’s princi-
ple prohibits using rational creatures—
humans—as mere instruments to attain
one’s own selfish goals. Tannert claims that
human reproductive cloning—through
somatic cell nuclear transfer or embryo
splitting—is immoral because it violates this
principle by using a human—the clone—for
egoistical purposes. However, as I dem-
onstrate, this assertion is problematic.
Although treating people created by cloning
as mere means—for example, as organ
banks—would be morally unacceptable, it
is misleading to identify cloning itself as the
core problem. Furthermore, although Kant’s
respect for humanity is of great practical
value, it does not provide us with adequate
guidance with regard to cloning. His moral
principle clearly applies to existing people,
but it falls short in helping us to determine
whether a particular means of creating 
people is morally permissible. As Deborah
Johnson explained in another context, often
“moral concepts and principles are ambigu-
ous in their application to new technology”
(Johnson, 2005).
If we ever hope to figure out why the
prospect of human cloning, especially
reproductive cloning, is so unsettling, we
must first remove any marginal problems
that infiltrate the arguments in this debate,
including Tannert’s. First, despite his explicit
rejection of genetic determinism, Tannert
ends up appealing to it. Second, he
assumes that only selfishness and egoism
could motivate someone to pursue repro-
ductive cloning. Third, he makes the
assumption that a cloned person would
inevitably be treated as a mere means.
Fourth, his appeal to Kant’s moral principle
fails to clarify where the line should be
drawn with respect to research cloning.
When engaging in discussionsabout cloning, genetic engi-neering or procreation, there is
a strong and prevalent tendency for argu-
ments to become entangled in genetic
determinism. Also known as genetic
reductionism or biological determinism, it
holds that the physical and mental traits
and behaviour of an individual are ulti-
mately determined by his or her genotype.
This myopic view fails to acknowledge
that the physical and social environment
of an organism also has an important role
in controlling whether and how genes
interact with each other and with the
organism’s environment. Genetic deter-
minism has dangerous implications as it
might encourage its believers to neglect
obligations towards fellow humans. For
example, an employer might conclude
that he or she has no obligation to reduce
the levels of toxic substances in the work-
place, because an employee’s risk of
developing, say, cancer is solely a function
of their genes. That is, embracing genetic
determinism encourages the view that
individuals, not environmental or socio-
economic conditions, are to blame
(Proctor, 1998; de Melo-Martín, 2005).
One corollary of genetic determinism
is the mistaken view that genetic identity
is equivalent to personal identity. Yet one
of Tannert’s major arguments against
cloning is that genetic identity carries
great weight; he claims that it is wrong to
“impose the genetic identity of any indi-
vidual on another” (Tannert, 2006). But it
is not clear that cloning restricts the auto-
nomy of the clone any more than would
reproducing with one particular individ-
ual rather than another or, in the case of
ARTs, with gametes from one donor rather
than another. In both cases, we place lim-
its on the possible genetic outcome of the
offspring, but in neither case is it clear
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whether or precisely how these limita-
tions have an impact on its autonomy. In
an article on the pros and cons of human
reproductive cloning, Dan Brock reminds
us that the idea of a unique identity “pre-
dates the development of modern genet-
ics” (Brock, 1998). Along these lines,
Brock also questions the dubious concept
of a “right to a unique genotype” and sug-
gests that the concept is incoherent, not
legitimate, and not to be taken seriously
(Brock, 1998). To place so much weight
on genetic identity is, in effect, to invoke
genetic determinism. Tannert’s claim that
cloning is wrong because it “imposes an
arbitrary restriction on the clone’s individ-
uality and/or external determination of a
future person—and therefore violates its
autonomy” goes against his preceding
rejection of genetic determinism. If identi-
cal twins are autonomous agents despite
their shared genetic identity, there is 
no good reason to think that a clone
would lack the capacity for autonomous
decision-making.
Tannert finds it particularly problematic
that a clone, unlike offspring created
through the combination of genetic material
from two individuals, is “the result of delib-
erate human decision and action… and is
therefore, through this arbitrariness, an
artefact”. Although a great deal of pro-
creation occurs ‘accidentally’, it is still the
result of some deliberate human action, be
it intercourse or several visits to an ART
clinic. It is not clear why cloning should be
considered either more or less arbitrary
than decisions to procreate through more
conventional means. The emphasis on the
means of procreation also detracts from the
more important criterion for determining
the moral permissibility of procreation,
namely, how offspring will fare once they
are born. Merely creating people by
cloning need not restrict their autonomy
any more than procreation through inter-
course or ARTs. Granted, as has been
shown by cloning experiments with ani-
mals, creating humans by cloning at this
stage is likely to be disastrous for the clone;
it might be impossible to advance to a
point at which cloning techniques do not
present an unacceptable risk for individual
clones, women, their fetuses and/or new-
borns. But if these risks of physical harm
were eliminated, it is uncertain whether
cloning would constrain autonomy any
more than any other means of procreation.
Tannert claims that cloning is wrongbecause “it only fulfils the selfishinterest of a creator”, but cloning
need not be motivated by either selfish-
ness or the desire to replicate a particular
genotype. Although cloning, by definition,
means the replication of an existing geno-
type, the motives to do so can vary. Along
these lines, Dena Davis draws a distinc-
tion between duplicative and logistical
cloning: in the case of duplicative cloning,
“it is the genetic replication itself that is
the attraction,” whereas the primary
motive in cases of logistical cloning is to
have a child (Davis, 2001). However, the
motives for duplicative cloning are usually
on the basis of gross misconceptions about
cloning, which abound in films, television
programmes—including those that claim
to be news programmes—and science-
fiction novels (Maio, 2006). There is a
nearly universal agreement that duplica-
tive cloning would be downright ludicrous
as well as immoral, and only those in a
state of intractable ignorance would want
to pursue it. As shown in Kazuo Ishiguro’s
novel Never Let Me Go, even fictional
characters no longer buy into genetic
determinism. For example, the narrator
Kathy H, herself a clone, makes the fol-
lowing observation: “Our models were an
irrelevance, a technical necessity for
bringing us into the world… It was up to
each of us to make our own lives… It is
daft to assume you’ll have the same life as
your model” (Ishiguro, 2005).
Logistical cloning, which would be a
means to circumvent obstacles to procre-
ation that cannot be overcome by alterna-
tive methods, might therefore be morally
permissible in some rare cases. If both
partners were sterile, cloning would be
the only means for them to have a geneti-
cally related child. A woman might want
to create a genetically related child with-
out having sex or using donated sperm.
She might find the practice of buying
gametes morally objectionable as it
allows individuals to procreate without
fulfilling any obligations towards the
child. Moreover, she might not want to
incur risks by using sperm from an anony-
mous donor; he might have failed to dis-
close important details about his medical
history, or he might pursue his desire to
have a role in the child’s life and thereby
cause legal problems and/or emotional
upheaval for the child. Another case in
which logistical cloning might be legiti-
mate would be if the man is sterile, the
couple believes the use of third-party
gametes to be morally objectionable and
both partners want a genetic connection
to the child. Logistical cloning, assuming
it could be done without exposing women
or children to any greater risk than that by
other means of procreation, might be
morally defensible in such cases.
If we accept such arguments for logisti-
cal cloning, then cloning does not neces-
sarily mean “using one person—the
clone—as the means to fulfil the desires of
another person: the clone generator”, as
Tannert claims. If fulfilling the desires of
the procreator to have a child constitutes
an immoral use of another person, we must
also concede that a great deal of ‘natural’
procreation is immoral for the same rea-
son. It is not at all uncommon for individu-
als or couples to create children to fulfil
several desires: to pass on one’s genes; to
ensure that there will be enough people to
work the farm, carry on the family busi-
ness, or care for the procreators in their old
age; to produce a ‘saviour sibling’ to save
the life of an existing child; to make money,
as in cases of full surrogacy; or simply to
satisfy an inexplicable but intense desire to
have a child. Cases of creating a child for
its own sake are more the exception than
the rule, if they exist at all.
The most likely reason for creating a
child by cloning would be to carry on the
family line. Although I find it mysterious
that genetic connections are so highly
prized—often more than social relation-
ships among individuals—there is no deny-
ing the importance accorded to genetic
ties. One of the reasons why ARTs are in
such high demand is that people want a
child who is genetically related to at least
It is not clear why cloning should
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one member of the couple. Considering the
prevailing attitude about the importance of
genetic links, it should come as no surprise
that some individuals might be interested in
cloning themselves or a beloved family
member, living or deceased.
There is probably no decision of simi-lar magnitude that is more arbitrarythan the one to have a child. On the
face of it, rationality and procreation seem
to be extremely odd bedfellows; indeed, it
is often the absence of rationality that
leads to conception. Although we might
prefer individuals to be more thoughtful
about their procreative decisions, they are
rarely criticized when such careful delib-
eration is absent or when their decisions
are obviously problematic. 
Even if individuals do not put a great
deal of thought into procreative decisions,
they might speculate about the possible
outcomes of their actions and recognize
that these possibilities are limited. These
limitations are also arbitrary, insofar as
they are the direct consequence of choos-
ing one particular person over the three
billion other people around the world with
whom one might have chosen to mate. In
some cases, these limitations can be dis-
concerting for the prospective parents or
other family members, including existing
children. If we want to construct a morally
sound objection to cloning, we must con-
front widely accepted procreative prac-
tices and subject them to scrutiny, lest our
objections to reproductive cloning ring
hollow. Ultimately, it seems that we must
choose between rejecting many of our
procreative practices as morally problem-
atic or conceding that reproductive
cloning is acceptable.
Ultimately, the means of procreation
are morally irrelevant unless they present a
significant risk to offspring or parents, par-
ticularly the mother. This is true of cloning
at present, and it is for this reason that we
should refrain from creating offspring in
this manner. But this is not to claim that
cloning is morally impermissible because
it involves using another as a mere means;
instead the claim is that it would be wrong
to create a person by cloning because that
person would probably be born in what
Joel Feinberg calls a “harmful condition”
(Feinberg, 1984).
As logistical reproductive cloning
would not automatically violate a person’s
right to self-determination or cut off a
child’s prospect of future autonomy, it is
erroneous to conclude that cloning always
constitutes using another person—the
clone—as a mere means. Setting aside cir-
cumstances under which conception is
likely to pose a risk to the offspring—for
example, if either parent carries a deva-
stating hereditary disease—there is noth-
ing intrinsically wrong with bringing a 
person into existence by one means
instead of another. It is important to place
greater emphasis on the actual treatment
of the offspring and not how he or she
came to be; if cloning is the problem, then
not only reproductive cloning but also
research cloning is problematic. The latter
could also be construed as being used for
self-interested or selfish motives, such as
to advance the researcher’s career. But
there is a more pressing problem related to
research cloning, to which I will now turn.
When we talk about reproductivecloning, we generally assume thatthe clone will be “live and viable”
(Gogarty, 2003), and ideally, if clones were to
be created, we would want them to be live,
viable and in good health. But how should
we deal with cloned humans that are beyond
the pre-embryo stage but unlikely to become
“live and viable” offspring? These latter
beings are no more ‘people’ than are pre-
embryos or embryos, and we therefore do not
violate their autonomy. If the entities in ques-
tion are non-sentient non-people and lack
the capacity to become people who will
experience pain or suffering as a result of
having been used in cloning research, 
an appeal to well-established principles, 
such as the principle of respect for people 
On the face of it, rationality and
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or the principle of non-maleficence, is of 
no help.
Although legally, in some countries, the
limit until which human embryos can be
destroyed to harvest stem cells is drawn at 14
days, it does not follow from Tannert’s argu-
ment that researchers are morally required to
stop there. In fact, given the significance
Tannert places on implanting an embryo in a
woman’s uterus, combined with his claim
that an artificial uterus would deprive an
embryo of “an essential condition for
becoming a human”, the implication is that
research on embryos or fetuses beyond 14
days would be justifiable. Clearly, if such a
being is missing a necessary condition for
becoming a person, it cannot become a per-
son; hence, a being that develops to 40
weeks or beyond by ectogenesis would not
be protected by Kant’s principle of respect
for people. Undoubtedly, using cloned
embryos and fetuses in research would pro-
vide us with more and better information
about the efficacy and safety of cloning, and
Tannert’s view gives us no reason to refrain
from doing so. In the end, his view about
research cloning could be construed as too
permissive, and his argument provides a
great deal of ammunition for those who
advocate a ban on all types of cloning,
including therapeutic cloning.
Although it might seem obvious, manydo not distinguish between cloningand its product, which, in the case of
logistical cloning, is a child who would be
nurtured, educated and loved by its parents.
There is no good reason to think that it
would be morally permissible to treat clones
differently to the way we treat other off-
spring or adults. To discriminate against
people because of the manner in which they
were conceived would be as unacceptable
as discrimination on the basis of skin colour
or sex. Although such prejudices do persist,
discrimination against people created
through ARTs is, to my knowledge, non-
existent. Various new methods of ART have
been invented during the past 28 years, and
it seems unlikely that adding a new one to
the repertoire will lead to an upsurge in dis-
crimination against offspring created by
cloning. Although there are concerns about
treating offspring as objects instead of
humans, this is relevant not only for off-
spring created through ARTs—which in the
future might include cloning—but also for
offspring conceived in the old-fashioned
way. Thus, our focus should be on obliga-
tions towards those whom we create, not on
how they were created.
We should refrain from making assump-
tions that the means by which one was con-
ceived or the conditions into which one is
born entail anything about what sort of 
people they will become or how we should
treat them. As humans, we should make use
of our unique capacity for moral agency, in
particular our capacity to have and fulfil
obligations. As Kant put it, the very act of
bringing another person into existence
means that parents have an obligation “to
make their children—as far as their power
goes—as contented with the condition thus
acquired” (Kant, 1790). Treating clones as
inferior to other humans is still safely in the
realm of fiction, and it should stay that way.
Fortunately, it is well within our grasp to
ensure that it does.
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